Friday, February 17, 2012

Hegel and Moral Development Theory

My previous experience with morality and moral theory has been within psychology. I think of morality as something that, within one self and with the world, is negotiated and molded, and through this process, changes and develops over a lifetime. The prominent theories of moral development in psychology describe mostly, with some variation, a morality of children being focused on rules and punishment for breaking those rules and eventually this morality develops into one based in principles and does not simply apply rules and norms. I don’t know Kant very well, but I see some of this in his ideas of a universal viewpoint as having a relationship to this development.

I am trying to see the connection between the development in moral reasoning as hypothesized in psychology and the discussion of morality as given by Hegel. However, I do not know that there is a direct or easy translation. I also don’t feel confident enough with the text to really make a statement about how it relates to moral development.

Do we see a development in Hegel’s writing that could be likened to that of a child? Or are the conflicts in the Phenomenology more situational, and more like the cycle one person would go through given a specific event or issue?

2 comments:

  1. Isn't it possible to view Hegel's developmental discourse from any number of angles? After all, it seems that much of the discussion within the Phenomenology, while at times obtuse, is still applicable to the development of consciousness, meaning that an analysis thereof need not suffer specificity.

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  2. I'm not sure how to answer your questions at the end of this post, but I am curious what relation you see between Kant's moral view and the development of moral reasoning from childhood to adulthood. To me, Kant's moral ideas seem pretty inflexible and would definitely be more like the end result of this development rather than the development itself. I'm probably just being way too picky. If the end result of a child's moral development is one based on principles WITHOUT, importantly, any threat of punishment, acting solely for the sake of what is right and nothing else, then I would definitely agree that it is like the Kantian position. To put it more strongly, even if there were a threat of punishment, the child shouldn't act appropriately merely because of that threat, but because it is right.

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