This week we began reading Marx, famous for his "materialist conception of history." To recap, we discussed the base-superstructure model, which starts at changes in the forces of production, the material conditions, which then affects the relations among the elements of a system, and finally then finally affects the superstructure of the system, including ideas, philosophies, and the like. Revolutions affect an old system in a similar way, creating new forces of production, which negates the relations of the old system, and then "negates the negation" to create new relations and ultimately a new superstructure. We see this model instantiated in Marx's pamphlet The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
Marx is well known for changing how we conduct socio-historical investigations. Since him, historians concern themselves primarily with things at the "material conditions" level. Rarely do we find any thorough contemporary text on past history without a strong grounding in the tangibles of that time (however loose the criteria for such tangibles may be). Certainly there is talk of changes in ideologies from one time or another, but it is usually accompanied with whatever social, economic, or otherwise material conditions that may have brought about that change.
Marx wrote The Eighteenth Brumaire very soon after the events he writes about take place. I'm no Marx historian, but a quick glance at the dates suggest that he was already well established in the philosophical-political scene, already having written the Communist Manifesto several years prior. Assuming that his materialist conception of history had already gained popularity by the time of the events of Louis Bonaparte's coup, we can expect to see most histories of these events to follow the scheme that Marx has set up. (If I may concede a little, I know there's a lot of assumption going on and I may not be entirely accurate. This section is more of a set-up for the next.)
Rather than asserting some positive thesis, I want to propose a kind of thought experiment challenge for the commenters. What would the events from 1848 to 1851 look like in history if it did not follow the model that Marx has provided? How would a Hegelian or some early historian before him approach this bit of history (assuming a Hegelian would actually bother with something concrete)? Would we start with a change in ideology and then somehow draw conclusions about the rest of a historical time period from there? Since we're so grounded in doing history from a "material conditions" point of view, it seems hard to isolate ourselves from that approach and do something different and earlier. Where would we even begin?
To him who looks upon the world rationally, the world looks rationally back. ~~G.W.F. Hegel
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ReplyDeleteIf we assume that Hegel would respond to this, I think that he would definitely recognize how much Marx flipped his idea. I am not a Hegelian scholar or am I a Marx scholar, but I would say that he would respond negatively. First and foremost, trying to think like Hegel, I would not understand how one can identify the object without using concepts. With this, the objects are already identified, like the proletariat and the peasants, and through relationships, ideas and principles are formed. This is like saying that one can identify the object without any idea of the universal. Also, speaking of Universals, I think that would not even conceive of Universals. Universals are concepts and principles and systems that are Universal to everybody. In this sense, if Universals can change through people, it is not a Universal, and it lacks any substance at all.
ReplyDeleteA few months ago I read "The Unbearable Lightness of Being", and though I have not yet read Nietzsche as a primary source, Kundera explores some of his concepts in this novel. I think that one of these ideas, namely Nietzsche's idea of eternal return, may be a possible alternative model to the one proposed by Marx. Nietzsche posits the idea of eternal return, that is, the idea that historical events/choices/actions recur into infinity and therefore have no transitory nature. This, he suggests, would give an event/action etc an enormous amount of weight, since it would be condemned to repeat itself perpetually. As things stand, however, everything is transitory, and thus everything is something "which does not return, is like a shadow, without weight" (Kundera 1). Surely this makes both the 'original' revolution and that of Louis Bonaparte mere shadow without force or weight?
ReplyDeleteIn other words, possibly Nietzsche would suggest that both are weightless repetitions of past events(since they are transient), and history history is circular and recurring; we keep falling back on our old mistakes.
I don't know how well I've articulated what I'm trying say; perhaps someone who's been exposed to Nietzsche could add something.
First of all, I think Marx would say that the events would have happened the way that they did whether someone (like him) was there to describe it in terms of the material conditions. Observing the process or describing it in materialist terminology does not change what happens. This being said, I would guess that the commentary would be very different in Marx's absence. The Hegelian model would suppose some change in the ideology of the time and the restructuring of society would be a result. Subsequent revolutions, however, were very much influenced by Marx's writings. How do you think that those later revolutions would have been different (or would have happened at all) in the absence of Marx's critique?
ReplyDeleteJust to defend myself, I didn't mean to suggest that the events of the 'Eighteenth Brumaire' would have actually occurred differently had Marx not been around. I only meant to raise questions about the changes in the account of the history in writing, rather than the actual events that constitute the history. But I definitely could have worded it better, and my statement could easily be interpreted the other way.
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