The Eighteenth Brumaire

This week we began reading Marx, famous for his "materialist conception of history." To recap, we discussed the base-superstructure model, which starts at changes in the forces of production, the material conditions, which then affects the relations among the elements of a system, and finally then finally affects the superstructure of the system, including ideas, philosophies, and the like. Revolutions affect an old system in a similar way, creating new forces of production, which negates the relations of the old system, and then "negates the negation" to create new relations and ultimately a new superstructure. We see this model instantiated in Marx's pamphlet The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.

Marx is well known for changing how we conduct socio-historical investigations. Since him, historians concern themselves primarily with things at the "material conditions" level. Rarely do we find any thorough contemporary text on past history without a strong grounding in the tangibles of that time (however loose the criteria for such tangibles may be). Certainly there is talk of changes in ideologies from one time or another, but it is usually accompanied with whatever social, economic, or otherwise material conditions that may have brought about that change.

Marx wrote The Eighteenth Brumaire very soon after the events he writes about take place. I'm no Marx historian, but a quick glance at the dates suggest that he was already well established in the philosophical-political scene, already having written the Communist Manifesto several years prior. Assuming that his materialist conception of history had already gained popularity by the time of the events of Louis Bonaparte's coup, we can expect to see most histories of these events to follow the scheme that Marx has set up. (If I may concede a little, I know there's a lot of assumption going on and I may not be entirely accurate. This section is more of a set-up for the next.)

Rather than asserting some positive thesis, I want to propose a kind of thought experiment challenge for the commenters. What would the events from 1848 to 1851 look like in history if it did not follow the model that Marx has provided? How would a Hegelian or some early historian before him approach this bit of history (assuming a Hegelian would actually bother with something concrete)? Would we start with a change in ideology and then somehow draw conclusions about the rest of a historical time period from there? Since we're so grounded in doing history from a "material conditions" point of view, it seems hard to isolate ourselves from that approach and do something different and earlier. Where would we even begin?

Morality and Aesthetics

First of all, I want to admit that I know next to nothing about aesthetics, particularly Hegel’s aesthetics. That being said, I thought that there were some interesting connections to aesthetics in the ‘morality’ chapter we read for last class. First of all, Hegel talks about different kinds of harmony that are connected with morality. Hegel identifies two different ‘postulates’ about different harmonies involving morality: “The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective Nature, the final purpose of the world; the other, the harmony of morality and the sensuous will, the final purpose of self-consciousness as such” (369). It seems like Hegel is saying that in is consciousness’ responsibility to bring about these harmonies, although he doesn’t exactly tell us what that would entail. He does, however, say that “consciousness has… to bring about this harmony and continually to be making progress in morality” (368). Without this harmony (either with objective Nature and/or with the sensuous) presumably morality wouldn’t be what it is. Besides this reference to harmony, Hegel also describes the rational, Kantian moral agent as a ‘beautiful soul’. The beautiful soul is the soul that can understand and properly apply the categorical imperative to particular situations. This beautiful soul, however, is not the final synthesis, but itself divides into acting and judging consciousness.

As I said, I don’t know much about aesthetics, however one similarity that immediately stands out to me is that both morality (or ethics more generally speaking) and aesthetics involve a kind of judgment that seems qualitatively different that other kinds of knowledge or belief. One might say that one makes a scientific ‘judgment’ about the world, but this seems different to me. This kind of knowledge claim seems of a different kind than one concerning morality or aesthetics. Perhaps what Hegel is pointing to in talking about morality and harmony and the beautiful together is that being able to perform one kind of judgment helps you perform the other. If aesthetic judgment is similar to moral judgment, then being able or good at one would help you make the other kind. This would seem to imply that learning how to make aesthetic judgments would help one make judgments about morality. If this is true, then aesthetics is a subject that would be incredibly important to teach, starting at an early age.

Interestingly enough, in the Republic, Plato makes the argument that a proper education consists of physical and musical parts. Perhaps what he intends in this musical education is learning the ability to make aesthetic judgments about particular harmonies within the music. This skill would then have very real practical consequences for the way someone with a ‘philosophical’ education would make moral judgments. Is this an appropriate connection to make? Are the connections between morality and aesthetics in Hegel as pronounced as I see them? Maybe someone with a little more experience with aesthetics can show me why this does or doesn’t make sense.

Hegel and Moral Development Theory

My previous experience with morality and moral theory has been within psychology. I think of morality as something that, within one self and with the world, is negotiated and molded, and through this process, changes and develops over a lifetime. The prominent theories of moral development in psychology describe mostly, with some variation, a morality of children being focused on rules and punishment for breaking those rules and eventually this morality develops into one based in principles and does not simply apply rules and norms. I don’t know Kant very well, but I see some of this in his ideas of a universal viewpoint as having a relationship to this development.

I am trying to see the connection between the development in moral reasoning as hypothesized in psychology and the discussion of morality as given by Hegel. However, I do not know that there is a direct or easy translation. I also don’t feel confident enough with the text to really make a statement about how it relates to moral development.

Do we see a development in Hegel’s writing that could be likened to that of a child? Or are the conflicts in the Phenomenology more situational, and more like the cycle one person would go through given a specific event or issue?

Hegel's Spirit Found in Morality

As we finish reading Hegel, I honestly do not have a complete grasp on the Phenomenology, since the book is dense and the style in my opinion is poor. However, that does not take away completely the importance of the subject matter and actual reality of Consciousness. That being said, I believe that knowledge of the truth , as abstract as it may sound, cannot be achieved without the full realization of Consciousness realizing itself in a couple of modes.

First off, correct me if I am mistaken, but Hegel's Consciousness is formed with knowledge. This knowledge is not only of subject but also Consciousness' knowledge of itself. While all of the basic foundations of knowledge includes, which includes sense-certainty and perception, are important to the process of frustrating the mind, the most important factor of knowledge has to reason. Without reason, nothing should make sense. A chair is not a chair if it's most basic essentials cannot be applied to the Forces of our daily life. The chair as a being for others needs its applications. As much as sense-certainty believes that it is sure of it-self, it cannot be called knowledge without reason.

The development of Spirit works in similar ways. In Consciousness, knowledge is heavily relied upon. As if we are speaking of the knowledge of self-consciousness has on Consciousness or the knowledge that Consciousness has of itself, reason plays a heavy role. I do not see Hegel developing the argument that I am about to make, but feel free to respond. I believe that through reasons that are provided through nature and morality are essential to Consciousness. Even though Hegel says that whatever is moral is rational, he does not place on the same spectrum as reason. The way that I feel is that when he talks about morality he would use terms such as moral action or morality as it fulfills duties. But when I speak of morality, I say that morality cannot exist without reason. Though that does not sound like I am provoking anything new, I believe that reason cannot exist without morality. For example, when we are talking about knowledge of object. I believe that morality is a determinant of the object. In the simplest form, I would ask how that object (for me) needs moral awareness and that determines the object. For example, let's say my object is a moral. The way that morality plays a role is that I would wonder how the book would be valuable in education. And since education provides knowledge, it is reasonable. On the other hand, some one can evaluate that book as being immoral, in the sense that the book must have came from paper which comes from trees; therefore, we are ruining the earth. However the perspective is, morality is essential to reasoning and knowledge. Thus, the development of Consciousness would be incomplete without morality being regarded as one of its ultimate determinant.

Tell me what you think. This is just something that I have been thinking of. I am not even sure if I undervalued Hegel's morality of misunderstood him.

Hegelian Morality in Postcoloniality

I would like to propose in this blogpost that Hegel's section on Morality can be equated to the postcolonial project. That is, the tension and resolution between the Acting and Judging consciousnesses finds a parallel in the postcolonial act of 'writing back' to colonial subjugation.

Hegel's section on Morality consists of a division in the Beautiful Soul, the separation into an Acting and a Judging Consciousness. Dr J outlined briefly the way in which each sees the other as a hypocrite. The Acting Consciousness -- possibly driven by an epiphany of some kind? -- comes to see part of his/her own hypocrisy in the Judging Consciousness. In other words, like all our encounters in the world, Acting Consciousness sees part of him/herself reflected in Judging Consciousness. Despite efforts to point this out to Judging Consciousness, however, s/he is ignored. Acting Consciousness benevolently forgives Judging Consciousness for this refusal to acknowledge their similarities, and this somehow uncovers and incites in Judging Consciounsess to see part of him/herself in Acting Consciousness. In this way reciprocal recognition is achieved.

In a similar way, colonisation was characterised by a refusal to recognise the colonised as human. This was technique used for a variety of reasons, one of them being economic: by constructing the idea of race, and categorising those with non-white skin as inferior, the colonisers were exonerated from guilt for their aggressive exploitation of non-whites. Thus dehumanised, the exploitation of non-white people required no justification or apology. The beginning of this relationship, then, can be equated to the Master-Slave Dialectic discussed in our previous class. In other words, while the master is recognised by the slave, the slave him/herself remains unrecognised and is 'put to work on the world'.

This relationship, however, seems to transform, as it does in consciousness itself. The slave seems to become the Acting Consciousness/colonised and the master the Judging Consciousness/coloniser (correct me if this process doesn't actually follow in the text itself). Thus, via postcolonial writing, the colonised begins using the language of repression to 'write back' and critique their oppressors. This writing can be seen as a type of assertion of their common humanity with the coloniser, and if not a realisation of their own 'hypocrisy' in their oppressors, then definitely the apprehension of some part of thesmelves in the coloniser. As with Hegel's story of Morality, so too the coloniser ignores or refuses to see the colonised in themselves, that is, their common humanity. Though it is an extremely contestable matter as to whether the colonised would forgive at this point, there definitely have been instances of unrequited forgiveness, for example Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela. In these cases, then, the hard edge of the coloniser is softened and they are led to recognise the common humanity of the colonised.

I realise that this is an idealistic picture, for many 'colonisers' still refuse to see the equal humanity of those who happen to have a different skin colour, especially in South Africa where the structure of Apartheid still reigns stronger than ever, so that even though the framework has been removed, segregatory practices continue to perpetuate themselves. This does not mean, however, that it is not an image of resolution that should be aspired towards.

As an aside, I was wondering whether I am corretc in interpreting the Judging and Acting Consciousness as a transformed continuation of the Slave and Master? If not, what is their relation?

The...Human...Master-Slave Dialectic

Hegel, acknowledging the complexities inherent to the Master-Slave Dialectic, chooses to simplify it for the first-time reader by describing the interactions of the two consciousnesses as if each consciousness were an individual person. This simplification lends the dialectic a narrative quality that makes it approachable to the reader, but I tend to think that it may—in some cases—cloud the reader’s understanding of what is actually going on between consciousnesses within one single consciousness. I say this, not just because I’m confused (I would have been confused, no matter how Hegel would have chosen to describe it), but because I believe that the construction of a fictitious human narrative and the assignment of human qualities to processes that are not really human can lure the untrained or ignorant reader (the not-yet-phenomenologist) into a perception of the text that adheres to, well, the human world. I suppose this yet unsupported statement raises the question, “If the Master-Slave Dialectic is not human, then what is it?” and that is not a question that I am fully prepared to answer. With that said, I don’t think my point is entirely unreasonable.

As I’ve been going through my memory of our discussion in class on Tuesday, I keep revisiting Phong’s objection to the “ceasefire” between the two consciousnesses that eventually results in Hegel’s famous Master-Slave Dialectic. In case you’ve forgotten what he said, I’ll eventually try to paraphrase it concisely in the context of the “bildungsroman” we have been following.

Before ever encountering another consciousness, the self-consciousness travels through its existence in search of something to help it achieve self-certainty. Along the way, it tries to validate its existence to itself by exerting its will on objects that cross its path until it destroys those objects and moves on to greener pastures filled with more destroyable objects. This “Nature of Desire” does ostensibly appeal to the basest human sensibilities, but the encounter with the second consciousness might not. For two consciousnesses to back down from Hegel’s “life and death struggle” in order to preserve the interests of each individual seems probable enough to me, since my real-world experience with consciousnesses is severely limited. However, Hegel’s transition from his unassailable world of phenomenology into a human narrative leaves him open to the assaults of humans like Phong and me.

As Phong said, and I tend to believe, it is unrealistic for a life and death struggle to turn non-violent without some form of communication between the involved parties. Granted, it is in the best interest for both consciousnesses to back down (Interestingly, it was also in the best interest of both involved parties for Aaron Burr not to drop Alexander Hamilton like the Federalist he was). The consciousnesses, however, stop all communication upon engaging in this struggle. I suppose I’m just a little hazy on the line between what is human and what is not human in the Master-Slave Dialectic. Any comments would be appreciated, and I will try my best to defend this somewhat haphazard post.

Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego and Hegel's "Perception"

This is probably pretty tangential to what we’re talking about in Hegel, but I’ve noticed an interesting parallel in Husserlian phenomenology, particularly with Edmund Husserl himself and Sartre, to the Also vs. One debate in Hegel’s “Perception.” For a quick overview, I’ll explain very briefly my understanding of phenomenology from Husserl’s perspective just for some background (and my knowledge is by no means exhaustive and probably doesn’t do the study justice, and I invite anyone to add their knowledge if they know more), then discuss Husserl and Sartre’s perspectives on the Self, and finally relate them back to Hegel’s Also and One.

Though they share the same name, Husserl’s phenomenology hardly resembles Hegel’s. Phenomenology here still refers to the study of appearances, but the methodology is quite different (no Hegelian dialectic as far as I can tell). What’s essential to Husserl’s methodology is called the phenomenological reduction, which involves “bracketing” any positing of some noumenal reality behind the appearances presented to us. What’s left to us is merely a description of appearances in a sort of Cartesian spirit: Describing appearances as they appear to consciousness. So much for the methodology. Husserl had some interesting thoughts on the Ego, the Self, and it bears some similarity to Kant. We conceive of the Ego here as something that unifies all the perceptions of consciousness across time. For Husserl, the ego was a transcendental ego. This means that one’s self is somehow behind the appearances but is not given as an appearance. Rather it is the thing that holds the appearances and all consciousness together. We can deduce from this that the ego is prior to consciousness: Before there is perception of anything, there is still an ego ready to unify whatever is given to it. This last point is important because it is something that Sartre explicitly rejects.

Sartre was also a phenomenologist of the Husserlian kind. His magnum opus Being and Nothingness expands upon the existentialist themes of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger in a methodology that resembles Husserl. To make many of the claims in this work, Sartre often appeals to his understanding of consciousness as a radical freedom, spontaneity; it is here where Sartre directly diverges with Husserl on the Ego. He completely rejects that the ego is transcendental, that it somehow lies behind appearances as a supersensible entity that holds consciousness together. Rather he sees the ego as a result of the workings of consciousness. In reduced form, for Sartre, there is a prereflective consciousness, for which there is no “I” or self; then there is reflective consciousness, which is not an “I” reflecting on itself but rather consciousness regarding itself as object (At this point there is still no I.); and finally reflection upon reflective consciousness produces the “I,” the ego, the self, and this self provides a sort of stability against the spontaneity of prereflective consciousness. We see then that self does not hold the appearances of consciousness together, but rather that the self is a byproduct of the workings of consciousness.

Okay, so what does this have to do with Hegel? Recall that Hegel says that in Perception we can perceive objects, but either as Also (the table is wooden, and also, firm, and also flat, etc.) or as One (there is a substance that is holding together the properties of the table: being woodeness, firm, flat, etc.). The debate between Husserl and Sartre seems to be an instance of the One vs. Also debate but with regard to the self only. Husserl seems to regard the self in sort of One fashion: The transcendental ego is that stuff that holds its properties, viz. consciousness and its contents, together. Sartre, however, more closely resembles the view of the Also. (Although I admit that for Sartre the analogy is a little loose. I think we can definitely agree though that the self for Sartre is definitely not a One at all.) I thought this was an interesting parallel. For more on Husserl and Sartre, there’s a good podcast on the same subject on Partially Examined Life series that Dr. Johnson mentioned, and I found the article on Sartre’s existentialism on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy informative.

Master-Slave in Artistic/Literary Development

             As a means of illustrating his conception of lordship and bondage within a single consciousness, Hegel presents phenomenologists with a fictitious story of an encounter between two people.  He does so, presumably, to engender understanding of what might otherwise be an incomprehensibly abstract internal process.  In his narrative, Hegel writes that a self-consciousness does not exist without the recognition of a separate self-consciousness.  Upon the recognition of an external self-consciousness, both self-consciousnesses are distraught and threatened at the existence of an alien self and seek to assert dominance over the foreign self.  Resultantly, a fight to the death manifests between the two self-consciousnesses, as both sides seem entirely willing to sacrifice their respective existences.  The attempted destruction of the mutually recognized external self results not in obliteration, but in domination, as one of the consciousnesses concludes that annihilation of the self is not an appropriate sacrifice for recognition.  As such, the conceding consciousness is subordinated to role of slave while the triumphant consciousness reigns masterfully over the former.  Both selves are thereby preserved by their respective roles of master and slave.  We find out, however, that these roles are not sedentary, as the lord becomes enslaved by the production of his lesser. 

                Despite Hegel’s insistence that this anecdote represent a process which happens within consciousness itself, the narrative may be similarly applied to real-world conflicts.  Although there are plenty of obvious historical examples (such as the eighteenth century French Revolution, colonization and subsequently declared independence in the United States, and the People’s Crusade during the eleventh century), it seems as though the dialectic of lordship and bondage could be applied to artistic and literary movements and developments as well.  Such examples may include the manifestation of the Romantic era during the eighteenth century.  Romanticist art and literature emerged in aggressive response to the Age of Enlightenment, during which rationalization, science, and objectivity prevailed.  Romanticist art (particularly romantic-era literature written by such authors as Lord Byron, William Blake, and John Keats) championed the value of emotion and aesthetic experience over previously popular Enlightenment ideals.  To this extent, it might be said that both the Romanticist and Enlightenment  periods represent two separate, yet equally valid modes of thought or consciousness which vied for dominance in a manner similar to that described by Hegel in the master-slave dialectic.  Are there any other artistic movements which can be analyzed particularly well through a Hegelian lens?

Consciousness as the Protagonist of the Buldingsroman

The more of Hegel I read, the more I am intrigued by the way in which Consciousness seems to assume the role of maturing protagonist of the Buldingsroman form. Breon Mitchell, in fact, speaks about the way in which the Buldingsroman follows a protagonist who is formed and changed by interaction with his milieu and the world. This definition of the process of development harks back to Chris's post two weeks ago, which outlines the milieu of Occupy and the way in which we are moulded by the movement and its ideas.

In his Preface, Hegel describes this process of development beautifully. In the same way that "the bud disappears in the bursting forth of the blossom, and...the former is refuted by the latter" (Hegel 2), so too Consciousness puts forth the bud of Sense-Certainty in an attempt to grasp true knowledge in the world. Finding this process to be unsatisfactory, it uses the defeat encountered in Sense-Certainty as the foundation of a new attempt.

Thus the bud blossoms and applies Perception as a way of finding Truth in the world. Now Consciousness resigns itself to mediation of the Object through itself, and uses Universals as a means of attaining its end. Once again, however, it encounters a problem, and is frustrated. There are two possibilities for Perception: either it encounters an object through the 'Also', that is, a collection of Universals and is indeterminate, or through the 'One', which is determinate and excludes. In this way, then, Consciousness encounters yet another dilemma, for it cannot encounter both a "many" and a "one", an indeterminate and determinate.

And thus Consciousness embarks on the final step of its process of development. It uses 'Force', which Dr. J describes as the Universal which is not sensuous, as the metaphysical lens through which Consciousness encounters the world. That is, the world is encountered as pinned down by physical laws, and in this way Understood.

I would like to offer a different approach to this end point of resolution. Dr. J asserted that, with regard to Perception, Consciousness is also frustrated because every Object stands in relation to another object. In other words, there are essences of other things in every Thing. If one applies an Existentialist approach to this idea, however, surely it is exactly this that allows Understanding. Put differently, looking at things as "ready-to-hand", that is, as connected and related to a web of things around them, allows an understanding of that object. Even if it is a subjective approach, for it requires the perceiving Consciousness to project itself into the Object to a degree, surely it garners understanding. Why would this Existentialist approach be problematic then? Is it unfeasible for Hegel's developing Consciousness to take the path of subjectivity?

Sense-Certainty: An Inherent Problem or One of Language?

Last class on the 31^st, we began with a review of sense-certainty and focused on whether we should consider sense-certainty’s frustration merely as a language issue or as an untenable position from the very outset. For awhile, I was firm in the language camp; I thought that sense-certainty was a maintainable form of consciousness if, hypothetically, one never ever wanted to make one’s knowledge communicable through mediation by universals. However, after our discussion, I’d like to change my position. Sense-certainty by its very nature is an untenable state of consciousness and its frustration is inherent and necessitates that it become something else. What follows will reiterate the thoughts said in the discussion and will hopefully illuminate what the problem is exactly and why we should choose one position over the other.

Sense-certainty is that form of consciousness which takes that which is immediately known as the surest form of knowledge. It strictly cannot make any use of universals, for doing so would be to mediate its knowledge; i.e., it takes what is immediately known and then translates it into the language of universal concepts, which would no longer make such knowledge immediate and would contradict the essence of sense-certainty. Thus any violation of immediate knowledge for such a consciousness would force it to reconcile this frustration—usually by becoming a more sophisticated form of consciousness. My instinct was that sense-certainty could remain in this state, where its knowledge is of this, here, and now (but without ever saying those concepts!), so long as it remained in its private world without communicating to others (forcing it to use universals). So long as this, here, and now remain unspoken, primitive immediacies, sense-certainty could maintain itself.

This was my position until we explored more deeply into this relation between consciousness and phenomenal object (if such a term is even applicable to sense-certainty), after which I changed my position to stating that sense-certainty is inherently untenable. If sense-certainty takes in immediate knowledge of the world as immediate, it cannot posit the relation between itself (the “I,” a universal) and its object. Instead, its knowledge is simply of objects as they are, immediately and unconditionally. Anyone familiar with Kant’s insights should be aware that it is problematic whenever the possibility of having immediate, unconditioned knowledge of objects is asserted. Such knowledge amounts to having knowledge of things as they are in themselves, which, according to their definition, is independent of one’s consciousness of it. To say that one is conscious of things as they are in themselves is a manifest contradiction in terms, but this is exactly what sense-certainty does. In not positing a relation between consciousness and object, it has no concept (not surprisingly) of a thing for consciousness, a phenomenal object, which is a necessary assertion for a true understanding of the world. Sense-certainty therefore commits itself by its very nature to an untrue image of the world, one in which a consciousness can know the unknowable. Sense-certainty must become something new.

(Note to Dr. Johnson: I would still like to be considered part of Group 1, so I will be authoring next week as well.)

Empirically Confused

In the ‘Consciousness’ section of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, consciousness makes a similar perspective of the world as a naïve empiricist (John Locke and George Berkeley comes to mind) who believes that the primary way of obtaining knowledge is through sensory experience rather than the notion that the mind is born with ideas and possesses the ability to access knowledge innately. Hegel, writing two centuries after the rise of British empiricism, leads the consciousness and all of its stubborn habits through a dialectic path that explores and expounds how and why sensuousness and other immediate forms of knowledge contain inherent conflicts that bring trouble to consciousness’s values and truths.

Hegel’s goal is to eventually bring consciousness to recognize that external objects from consciousness do not contain an essence to themselves that leads consciousness to understanding. We currently finished the transition from sense-certainty to perception by recognizing that sense certainty contains the two dilemmas of 1) explanation without using universals, as well as 2) the necessity of mediation for consciousness. Perception arises from these two conflicts after recognizing the necessity of universality amongst sense-certainty and the objects sense certainty was so certain of.

We can notice the transition with Hegel’s choice of altering the “this” into “the thing with many properties” (Paragraph 112). Yet due to this correction, consciousness brings upon itself the question of how so many properties are linked into one object. Hegel provides with two possibilities of how a thing may contain the properties, but due to their contrasting nature, this brings another conflict. It is in the search to find a solution to the conundrums that directs the phenomenologists for the rest of the chapter, yet perception is left in the dust so to speak, for it is unable to posit one of the sensual models as the truth of objects. These pursuits are futile, and once again, consciousness is led into despair. Consciousness is then forced to go past the empirical sensual universals and pursue something beyond the exterior world. This is where the powers of force and metaphysics come to save consciousness and finally achieve what Hegel calls, understanding.

What I’m curious to know is what would an empiricist say in response to the Hegelian stance on consciousness besides the obvious prattling and winging? We can look back on Hegel’s work make an argument based on physical laws (the concept behind force vs. quantum physics), but I don’t believe that this will bring about anything substantial besides a quick explication of error. If anyone has a suggestion it would be more than helpful.

Getting Personal with Hegel

In Sense-Certainty, we talked about how knowledge about an object cannot exist without mediation. There is no immediate knowledge besides the “Here” and “Now,” which are fleeting and cannot be particular to an object if they are our only descriptors. Then later, in Perception we talked about the two conflicting, yet logical approaches of the “One” vs the “Also”; a bundle-view or a substance-attribute approach? In discussing these ways that consciousness approaches an object, taking into consideration particulars and universals, mediated and immediate knowledge, I can’t help but think back another step. What about Hegel and his life was mediating this contemplation of mediating knowledge. In bringing up the issue of modifying an object’s description to fit the knowledge/vocabulary we have (we don’t always say what we mean because of the limitations/interpretations of language), I can’t help but think about the ways in which Hegel’s experiences would have shaped this writing.

How might Hegel’s work have been a molding of what he already knew? How did the events of Hegel’s life mediate what he was learning and influence the Phenomenology? If Hegel had been theorizing about consciousness after the Phenomenology had been written, what would he have said it? Much of Hegel’s writing and thinking is in response to Kant. What, then, would he have written about had there not been a Kant before him to refute or argue with? We have also referenced the influences of Hegel’s historical context. To what extent should that factor into our analysis of Hegel?

In the same way that we talk about negation with the identity of an object, we can talk about negation with Hegel’s identity. Can Hegel be defined without being not like other philosophers? I know that theories overlap, but if there were no one to negate (or stand in opposition to) the theories of Hegel, would those theories just be truth in life and not a philosophical theory? To define the ‘this’ of philosophical theory, you have to be able to say ‘not this’..? Is there any way to begin theorizing without being influenced by something (a belief, an experience) that could deviate your theory from truth?

I think this might call for some kind of hermeneutic circle...






Thoughts?

The Finite Mind

From the beginning of the Phenomenology, we are presented with the idea of the finite mind. Can a finite mind process the absolute? Obviously, according to Hegel this is possible through a system of contradictions. What I mean by saying a system of contradictions is that the mind, through being finite, can only understand things through a lens of our finite-ness, and this creates contradictions and problems to our speculative truth. I believe that naturally, people weigh the contradictions and justifications, but it seems that Hegel has abandoned this tendency to a more radical approach. Insofar that I have read, Hegel quickly abandons the truth at question and moves on.

The problem that I see with this approach is that after stumbling upon a problem, Hegel seems to just assume that the approach much not be correct. Though I am not saying that Hegel's methods are wrong, I believe that with the assumption that this is a finite mind, the contradiction that has arisen may be wrong. And so, the finite mind may just be in its finite-ness and may have overlooked something about the truth at question. Simply put, the contradiction may not have been a contradiction at all, but just in the act of being limited. Though this may sound like I have overlooked Hegel's purpose and method, this is just an idea that I have thought of.

However, this might be Hegel's point that our mind is limited and that contradictions will arise. And through these contradictions and re-evaluations, the absolute will be the product. I do not know if I am saying the same thing as Hegel is meaning. This is where I need help figuring out.