Friday, February 3, 2012

Getting Personal with Hegel

In Sense-Certainty, we talked about how knowledge about an object cannot exist without mediation. There is no immediate knowledge besides the “Here” and “Now,” which are fleeting and cannot be particular to an object if they are our only descriptors. Then later, in Perception we talked about the two conflicting, yet logical approaches of the “One” vs the “Also”; a bundle-view or a substance-attribute approach? In discussing these ways that consciousness approaches an object, taking into consideration particulars and universals, mediated and immediate knowledge, I can’t help but think back another step. What about Hegel and his life was mediating this contemplation of mediating knowledge. In bringing up the issue of modifying an object’s description to fit the knowledge/vocabulary we have (we don’t always say what we mean because of the limitations/interpretations of language), I can’t help but think about the ways in which Hegel’s experiences would have shaped this writing.

How might Hegel’s work have been a molding of what he already knew? How did the events of Hegel’s life mediate what he was learning and influence the Phenomenology? If Hegel had been theorizing about consciousness after the Phenomenology had been written, what would he have said it? Much of Hegel’s writing and thinking is in response to Kant. What, then, would he have written about had there not been a Kant before him to refute or argue with? We have also referenced the influences of Hegel’s historical context. To what extent should that factor into our analysis of Hegel?

In the same way that we talk about negation with the identity of an object, we can talk about negation with Hegel’s identity. Can Hegel be defined without being not like other philosophers? I know that theories overlap, but if there were no one to negate (or stand in opposition to) the theories of Hegel, would those theories just be truth in life and not a philosophical theory? To define the ‘this’ of philosophical theory, you have to be able to say ‘not this’..? Is there any way to begin theorizing without being influenced by something (a belief, an experience) that could deviate your theory from truth?

I think this might call for some kind of hermeneutic circle...






Thoughts?

2 comments:

  1. To the last bit of your second paragraph, I think we should definitely consider Hegel's historical context. In the podcast that Dr. J recommended, the speakers talk about how Hegel's work is something like "a Platonic dialogue between all the philosophers of history" (the quotation is not exact, but something like it). I think we would expect the work to be very different if there weren't a Kant before him (or a Hume or an Aristotle). I like the question of what would Hegel's theories of consciousness be after the Phenomenology was written. I think we should expect it to be different even then, because like we've been pointing out consciousness is always revising itself.

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  2. Additionally, I think this post relates to the above post regarding Hegel's development as a sort of bildungsroman. Although we can never know how Hegel might have been influenced under other circumstances, in one sense, I don't think it matters. Hegel's overarching point seems to be not about how specific consciousnesses are affected but rather that consciousnesses are affected and prone to the same general process. The specifics of Hegel's bildungsroman may or may not have determined his writing of the Phenomenology but his point therein seems to indicate general irrelevance.

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