In the first sentences of Perception, Hegel discusses the relationship between perception and
universality, writing: “Immediate certainty does not take over the truth for its
truth is the universal, whereas certainty wants to apprehend the This. Perception, on the other hand, takes what is
present to it as a universal. Just as
universality is its principle in general, the immediately self-differentiating
moments within perception are universal: ‘I’ is a universal and the object is a
universal. That principal has arisen for
us, and therefore the way we take in perception is no longer something that
just happens to us like self-certainty; on the contrary, it is logically
necessitated” (111). The notion of
perception as an occurrence which necessarily ‘takes what is present to it as a
universal’ is misleading. Although
perception may take what is present
to it as universal, it is not requisite.
It seems possible for perception to coexist alongside doubt, causing a
cognitive disassociation of perception with universality. This disassociation lends uncertainty to Hegel’s
understanding of perception as defined by the universality of
self-differentiating moments therein, as it requires that perception accurately
distinguish through a lens of subjectivity, which would be, contrary to Hegel’s
assertion, unattainable.
Furthermore,
Hegel writes that “for us, or in itself, the universal as principle is the
essence of perception, and, in contrast to this abstraction, both the moments
distinguished—that which perceives and that which is perceived—are the
unessential. But, in fact, because both
are themselves the universal or the essence, both are essential. Yet since they are related to each other as
opposites, only one can be the essential moment in the relation, and the
distinction of essential and unessential moment must be shared between them”
(112). Hegel’s logic in this instance is
difficult to comprehend, as it requires ‘that which perceives’ and ‘that which
is perceived’ to be essential, unessential, and/or neither at once. Can anyone shed light on what seems to be an
impossibility?
When I was reading Perception I gathered that Hegel was trying to show, with logic, that Perception as it is known and described, contains an inherent conflict. And I believe that what you have written down is that very conflict. It is impossible for the subject and object to both be essential and unessential, yet so it appears to be due to perception.
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