I’d like to write about a statement Hegel makes right at the outset of the Preface to the Phenomenology. I think it is indicative of how Hegel perceives philosophical cognition, and I believe it stands in stark contrast to the attitudes and inclinations of our scientific age. In paragraph 2, on truth, he writes, “The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements” (p. 2). Judging by our discussion of the Absolute and the dynamic nature of the Notion, it appears Hegel certainly would advocate understanding philosophical progress as “the diversity of systems as the progressive unfolding of truth.” Our scientifically-oriented minds tend to be strictly binary with regard to propositions, statements, or beliefs. This or that proposition is either true or false with no gray area in between. Indeed, the study of logic calls this the Law of the Excluded Middle. It follows then, if we believe the law to be true, that we should regard this or that philosophy, insofar as it is merely a set of propositions, as either true or false. Subsequent philosophies for a given subject matter must be intended to affirm or contradict some prior philosophy to the effect that a contradicted philosophy should be completely disavowed. This is the sort of method that today’s scientific mind is accustomed to.
Judging by some background reading of Hegel and our first discussion in class, it appears that Hegel seeks to divorce philosophical cognition from that sort of method. His dialectic, his ideas on the Absolute, suggest that newer philosophy is meant to refine old philosophy, to build on top of the older. The new is not meant to replace and contradict the old, but it’s meant to include the old’s contributions within itself. All philosophy, it seems then, is positive, and should never be regarded as demolishing.
As indicated above, we must be cognizant of the fact that, as you say, any given philosophy is merely an assemblage of a set of propositions. In this sense, despite the manifestation of an overarching philosophy resultant from a set of claims, it is possible to disagree with the greater philosophy while accepting certain elements therein. You write that "we should regard this or that philosophy, insofar as it is merely a set of propositions, as either true or false." Clearly, as you state, this is not what Hegel attempts to accomplish. Recognizing the truth inherent to constituent propositions within a largely disagreeable greater philosophy, it is possible for a philosophy to achieve the partial maintenance of truth with also seeming mostly false. Differentiating between those elements which exude truth and those which render a philosophy incomplete/inaccurate leads to, as you say, the inclusion of "the old's contributions within itself."
ReplyDeleteThis is exactly the problem I have with the scientific approach. It assumes that there is this dialectic of true and false, right and wrong, and as such, tries to fit everything into these two convenient boxes. It denies ambiguities, areas of discussion that possibly don't fit into either box. I think this approach can produce a mindset that reults in harm. Just take the example of gender: everyone is expected to fit into either 'masculine' or 'feminie', but what if you don't feel comfortable in either of those categorisations?
ReplyDeleteHegel, then, in my view constructs and extremely productive system of gaining knowledge. As you point out, he suggests that one philosophical argument is influenced by and grows out of the one that came before it, and for this reason cannot just be thrown into the category of 'wrong' or 'incorrect'. This is because it is just as necessary, or, as Hegel portrays it, the flower is necessary for the fruit, even if the fruit replaces it.