In Schacht's journal article A commentary on the Preface to Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit", he points out Hegel's reaction to Romanticism as an inferior mode of gaining knowledge, suggesting that it "[reverts] to an essentially more primitive sort of thinking" (Schacht 3). This is suggested throughout the Preface, but most clearly in Hegel's assertion that "the intelligible form of Science is the way open and equally accessible to everyone" (Hegel 7), and later that "knowledge is only actual, and can only be expounded, as a Science or a system" (13). On the other hand, however, Romanticism's preoccupation imagination/feeling as a way of gaining knowledge called for a focus on the subjective experience of the individual with the world. Interestingly, the Romantics were attacking the Enlightenment (which preceded them and valued empirical science as the only method of gaining knowledge), thus demanding a more subjective approach. Is Hegel then calling for a reversion to the empirical sciences in his Preface?
According to Schacht, Hegel's use of the term 'scientific' should not be equated with empirical science. Logic, rather, captures Hegel's meaning since "the Truth or the essential nature of things consists in a network of logically related concepts, [and] can only be grasped through a philosophical mode of thought that is rigorously rational and logical" (Schacht 2). This may relate to the three modes of concept that Professor Johnson pointed out in class (Universal, Particular and Individual), for it is possibly the case that Hegel found fault in both the approach of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. On the one hand, the Enlightenment placed all its emphasis on the Universal of empirical science, while the Romantics placed all the focus on the Individual subjective experience. Both of these result in extremes that obscure the attainment of Truth.
Perhaps, then, Hegel is positing a new approach to knowledge, one that incorporates all three modes of concept: Universal, Particular and Individual. He seems to do this by proposing "intuition of [the Absolute]" (Hegel 4) as a way of gaining knowledge of the True. If the Absolute is the unity of subject and substance, as well as the process which brings this about (as Professor Johnson suggests), then surely Hegel is combining the approaches of both the Enlightenment and Romanticism. For in order to gain this knowledge, the Subject must experience the Substance "through conceptual, rational thought" (Schacht 2), and yet, simultaneously, subjective fragments of the Subject are revealed in the Substance/object. Thus Hegel unites the Subject and the Substance, the subjective and objective, the internal and external, and in this way gestures towards the Absolute.
Works Cited
Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
Schacht, Richard. "A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit". Philosophical Studies: And International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 23, No. 1/2 (1972).
I'm glad I'm not the only one that recognized parallels to Romanticism! Despite his heavy emphasis on science, Hegel seems to rely on the concept of intuition to achieve the realization of consciousness. While he calls this process of realizing truth, "the education of consciousness," which denotes a rigorous, scientific process, he goes on to state, "the Soul is the actual fulfillment of the resolution." By "soul" he appears to mean a somewhat inherent capacity for understanding that uniquely characterizes the individual. In this sense, the "soul" refers to intuition, which is the instrument of "bringing about a state of despair." In regards to his dialectic or circular understanding, the existence of an intuition appears necessary: If we cannot understand the concept of Man without a subsequent understanding of the self, but the very concept of Man helps to provide the definition of the self, how are we ever able to break into that circle of understanding without an inherent knowledge (intuition) of one of these concepts from which to build?
ReplyDeleteI definitely agree that Hegel is not defending an empirical approach. While the Enlightenment can be seen as promoting the empirical sciences, I would argue that the important part of science that is being defended is the objectivity or universality that comes along with it. It is a bit strange, because this universality doesn't really follow from the empirical method used by science. For example, Hume shows that experimental science can at best show constant conjunction, but never causation.
ReplyDeleteWhile my knowledge of Romanticism is limited, its focus on feeling would mean that Hegel might describe it as a form of sense certainty. Perhaps someone who is more familiar with Romanticism could describe why this is not the case.
Well, I don't think the Romantic type of 'feeling' can be described as a species of sense-certainty because it focuses on the emotions, imagination, intuition. That is, it deals with the irrationality of the human mind rather than attempting to describe it rationally. Sense-certainty, on the other hand, deals with that which is immediately apprehended by the senses via the medium of the consciousness, which, while still a literal feeling through the senses, seems like more of a 'rational' pursuit.
DeleteIs it any more rational though? From what I understand, Hegel seems to conclude that sense-certainty is irrational since it can't express what it wants to say, and as such is untrue.
I think this connection between Romanticism and Hegel is very interesting. Before now, I have always thought of Romanticism in the context of an English class, learning about literature's focus on the individual self and imagery of nature, etc. I did some research in light of this post to better familiarize myself with a more philosophical understanding of Romanticism and found some interesting analysis of the novel "Sophie's World" (I'm sure many of you have heard of it!) in light of Hegel and Romanticism. In the book, the characters talk about how some books write themselves, with the authors only adding their expertize occasionally. This lent to a discussion about the concept of non-communicable ideas and how we lose critical aspects of many ideas when we put them into words, written or spoken. This made me think about our discussion in class about words not representing what we really mean, and the idea that what is unutterable is untrue. What would this mean, then for the concept of feelings as important to Romanticism, if these feelings cannot be explained through words?
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