Friday, March 30, 2012

Reposing of the Question

Last class, we brought up the question (I think Kharys was the first to ask it), "Just what is Kierkegaard getting at in this writing?" There was a general feeling that said, "Okay, Kierkegaard's done a great job characterizing faith as that paradox of the single individual being higher than the universal, but so what? Does this mean that we should think twice and maybe look admirably on those people who show such great 'faith' by murdering their kids because they say God told them too? We still say that, as moral people, we have to condemn them, so what are you trying to say Kierkegaard?" While I don't think that Kierkegaard is advocating looking for morally objectionable situations where we can demonstrate our faith, he certainly does want to get the word out to the people around him that faith is more difficult than it seems. I think we're all curious, however, as to what the value of this awesome faith is. If faith requires us to be prepared to commit something morally blameworthy all in order to enter into some mysterious relationship where the individual is absolutely related to the absolute in such a way that he won't be able to communicate this relationship, resulting in no rest in the universal and plenty of anguish at thesingularity, then how many Christians would jump for the chance at having faith? But perhaps that is the whole point that Kierkegaard wants to make to the community around him, but it's still difficult to find something unmistakeably positive about faith. It almost makes more sense to read Kierkegaard as a criticizer of Christianity, showing what kind of nutty things the Christian has to commit to in order to be faithful. It's really ironic that Kierkegaard is actually a Christian himself.

I don't have a positive thesis to put forward here, but I have re-articulated the sentiments we had over "what the point" of all this is about. For comments, I think it might be insightful to provide a defense for why we should consider faith as something intrinsically valuable. From Kierkegaard, it seems sort of taken for granted that faith is good and something to be achieved, but his description of it makes the value of its attainment very dubious.

3 comments:

  1. I think you bring up a good point: Why value faith? I think that what Kierkegaard is showing us that that the structure of faith is much more complicated and interesting than we philosophers might originally think. If we take Kant and Hegel at their word, then faith is just watered down morality. What I think Kierkegaard is ultimately saying is that faith is valuable, even more valuable than 'philosophy' in the Kantian or Hegelian sense because the structure of doubt is much simpler that of belief. We should care about faith because an analysis of the structure of faith radically questions the role and status of philosophy, and as 'good philosophers' I think if we take this charge seriously, we ought to think about possible responses.

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  2. I think it seems as if Kierkegaard actually does not jump to conclusion. Even though I feel as if Problema II is a criticism to Hegel and to the realm of faith, Kierkegaard does not actually tell us what to conclude. He simply presents us with ideas and his thoughts... To me, this means that his intentions, though leaning towards faith as a personal (individual) relationship with the absolute, is to define faith. To elaborate, I think that Kierkegaard wants to point out a few things: (1) To present a different narrative of faith for philosophers and the "faithfuls". I think that this is a situation in which if the criticism hurts, then it is doing its job. His intentions, obviously everything in my perspective, is to get a reaction that is aimed at a reassessment of values. (2) To point out the criticisms of radical individualism at the expense of the divine (and at the same time suspending reason/ethical. These are the things that I realize from the reading. Honestly, if that evaluation of "authentic" faith is to be believed, then faith is a journey with the possibility of never having it realized (since it is extremely rare.

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  3. I'm sorry, I have no such defence. The fact that Kierkegaard continues to characterise Abraham as the greatest man, the most admirable kind of man, remains strange to me, especially since both of these terms imply emulation. Perhaps, as Phong says, it's something exceptionally rare, something that takes an exemplary amount of courage and not which is not to be aspired towards, but just be admired (which seems to be yet another paradox).

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