Last class, we emphasized the point that all value judgments should be regarded as rank-ordering and rank-establishing. This is a striking statement, but with some thinking I think we can confidently conclude that it is true. It seems intrinsic to the very nature of what values are (however we may disagree on the finer points) and what judgments do: Values, by definition, are attached to things in order to set them apart as "higher" in some respect, so a value judgment should be establishing something as higher than something else -- at least in some sense. Generally, I think this statement is fairly uncontroversial; however, it does get a little tricky when we examine moral judgments as a subcategory of value judgments. Some of us might be hesitant to admit moral judgments as rank-ordering as well. I still think, however, that it holds that all value judgments, including moral ones, intend to establish rank, and I will attempt here to defend why.
The protest might go: "If we subscribe to some moral system (e.g., a deontological theory like Kant's), then our judgments/actions are not motivated to establish rank but rather to do the right/good thing (like acting for the sake of duty and the moral law). I think Nietzsche's naturalist approach will be helpful in seeing how even these moral judgments/actions are still in fact rank-ordering. Given Nietzsche's set-up of master (aristocratic, Homeric, etc.) values and the oppression experienced by slave peoples, it seems then that moral theories, or morality in general, seem to arise as an expression of ressentiment of these slaves. The very nature of this expression is indicative of the higher motive to invert the values of master morality. We should note a distinction here, a sort of dual-way we can look at morality: either as (1) within a moral system or (2) outside of a moral system (such as the naturalist perspective). Within the confines of a given moral system, actions and judgments are never regarded as rank-ordering. However, if we step outside of these confines into the perspective of the naturalist observer, we see that these ostensibly "good deeds" actually have an ulterior motive to invert the values of the master class -- and inverting values is in fact one way of establishing rank. The ulterior motive of any morality project then seems intrinsically rank-ordering.
For comments, is there a way that we can view morality from an objective third-person standpoint (not as an adherent to the moral system) and still see moral judgments as actions as genuinely for the sake of the good, or are we forced to admit that there is always an ulterior rank-ordering motive?
To him who looks upon the world rationally, the world looks rationally back. ~~G.W.F. Hegel
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ReplyDeletedon't think that we can view morality for an objective third-person standpoint, and I don't think that Nietzsche would say that we can either. I'm not sure I understand what you mean by 'from outside a moral system'. Perhaps before the epoch of slave morality there wasn't a 'moral system' in the way we think of it now, however now that we live within a system of morality, I'm not sure if we can completely think of something entirely outside of that system. This does not mean that one ought not attempt to move beyond the system, but just that one should first recognize that the system exists and that any new system will be 'stamped with the birthmarks' (in Marxian language) of the previous one.
DeleteI agree with Ben: it doesn't seem possible to view morality from an objective third-person standpoint. In fact, I don't think anything can be viewed objectively, least of all values. As the existentialists pointed out, there is always of a part of ourself that we project into an object or idea. In every encounter with the world, we are also encountering parts of ourselves. For this reason then, as well as Nietzsche's history of morals, it does indeed seem that morals are rank ordering, even if people are oblivious to this.
ReplyDeleteWould encountering somebody -- and this person likely doesn't exist -- entirely unfamiliar with moral systems of any kind provide a lens through which we could view morality objectively?
ReplyDeleteI do not think that realistically someone can be unfamiliar with moral systems, just that someone is familiar with the moral system that we adhere to. Even today, moral systems differ from hemispheres and countries. I think that objectively we could judge something as economically good by weighing the cost and benefits of an action, but morality in my eyes are completely subjective.
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